Yes, argues Robert Nicholson. The fact that the International Criminal Court is unlikely to succeed in prosecuting imagined Israeli crimes is irrelevant. The Palestinian lawfare campaign can achieve its ends even without achieving its desired verdicts. Nicholson writes:

Form is more important than substance in the lawfare strategy. It’s not necessary that litigants present strong arguments or even win cases. What’s important is that they appear outnumbered and heroic, adhere to lofty vocabulary, and use the court’s noble reputation to delegitimize their opponent in the eyes of the world. . . .

If everyone in the global audience appreciated the cynicism behind this strategy, lawfare would not be so worrisome. But well-meaning people are easily fooled by headlines of “war crimes” and “ethnic cleansing” and don’t have the time or legal training to investigate the facts. Shaking their heads in disbelief, they walk away with just one thought: Israel is a flagrant human-rights abuser that needs to be punished—international law says so. And here lies the crux of the problem: lawfare uses a façade of morality to conceal and advance a subversive political agenda. Worst of all, good people can’t see past the façade.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.