In 2011, as the Arab Spring came to Bahrain and protestors filled the streets, President Obama spoke out in favor of democratic reforms in the small island country, which is home to the U.S. Navy’s Fifth Fleet. When Bahrain’s royal family responded with repressive measures, the U.S. protested publicly on several occasions. About a year later, however, Washington abruptly ceased its pressure—unwisely, as Elliott Abrams explains:

The United States maintains considerable leverage in [Bahrain’s capital] Manama. Even a small drawdown of U.S. military personnel would reverberate loudly there, as would moving—or even announcing a study of moving—any piece of the U.S. military presence out of Bahrain. . . . More public pressure might well force the royals to think harder about compromises, and strengthen the hand of those who are privately arguing for reform. . . .

[Now Bahrain] is on a path toward increasing instability, featuring growing Sunni extremism, growing Shiite outrage, and ever-widening sectarian divisions. The Fifth Fleet is a hostage, and the Obama administration is spending hundreds of millions of dollars there as if America’s welcome will be permanent. That’s a suspect assumption: as the majority of Bahrainis conclude that the United States is indifferent to the crackdown and siding with the most regressive elements of the royal family, support for the Fifth Fleet’s presence will start to disappear. As will Bahrain’s very sovereignty, as it is caught up in the regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Once upon a time, Bahrain was an outpost of civility and moderation in the Middle East. Now, it is coming to share the pathologies of its neighbors. That’s tragic, and it is in part the result of weak American policy. By placing security matters—Bahrain’s minuscule participation in the anti-Islamic State coalition and its hosting of the Fifth Fleet—above all other considerations, the Obama administration is putting that very security relationship at risk.

Once upon a time, Bahrain was also an example of a sensible Obama human-rights policy. Today, one can sadly say that it’s a good example of how that human-rights policy has vanished into thin air.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.