Benjamin Netanyahu’s electoral victory has prompted much talk of American Jews feeling themselves increasingly “distant” from Israel. Some of this talk takes the form of loosely (or not-so-loosely) veiled threats: if Israelis don’t start voting the way American Jews supposedly want them too, they will lose American-Jewish support. Shmuel Rosner contends that this talk is based on faulty assumptions:

[W]hy blame Israel and its decisions for the phenomenon of “distancing”? Why presuppose that it is the Israeli voters that need to change their outlook to win favor with American Jews—and not conclude that it is American Jews that need to change their outlook to win favor with Israeli Jews?

The threat of “distancing from Israel” is based on two faulty pillars: that politics is a main driver of connection and disconnection to Israel [and] that Israel needs American Jews more than they need Israel. . . .

I don’t accept these assumptions—because they are unproven and untrue. Unproven because, as we’ve seen in many studies in recent years, the political divide is not the main driver that determines the connection of Jews to Israel. Of course, this might change, but thus far it has not. Untrue, because American Jews need the connection to Israel no less than Israel needs this connection.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.