Examining the most recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency on Iran’s nuclear program, as well as Iran’s ballistic-missile arsenal and its history of avoiding inspections, Dore Gold soberly sums up the prospects of the West’s impending agreement with the Islamic Republic:
The new agreement between Iran and the P5+1 [powers] that is presently being completed will leave Iran’s massive nuclear infrastructure largely intact. . . . Iran has not put its weaponization efforts on the negotiating table, nor will it. Neither has it agreed to allow its huge ballistic-missile forces to become a subject of discussion. For that reason, Israeli spokespeople have been saying that Iran will be at the threshold of having nuclear weapons. . . .
Undoubtedly, there are those in the West who are convinced that if Iran violates its agreement and crosses the threshold to assemble a nuclear weapon, it would immediately face a strong reaction which could include the use of force. [But] there is an enormous problem for anyone who thinks that this last stage of assembling a nuclear weapon can be reliably detected. . . . Iran could acquire nuclear weapons without being detected unless a future agreement gave the West the right to move all over Iran with little notification. Given [previous experience with Iran inspections], there is no indication that the West will have an inspection regime of this sort.
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