Saudi Arabia and Egypt have put together a coalition of Sunni Arab states to stop the takeover of Yemen by the Iranian-backed Houthis. This effort, write Gallia Lindenstrauss and Yoel Guzansky, is part of a larger attempt to create an alliance that will counter expanding Iranian influence. But the coalition’s newest prospective partner is Turkey, a problematic supporter of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood:

Saudi Arabia has outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood, but reports indicate that the new king is considering a more open approach to Hamas, a derivative of the Brotherhood—with the objective of bringing it into the anti-Iranian alliance in formation. The possible softening of Saudi Arabia’s position vis-à-vis the Muslim Brotherhood is a good basis for improving relations between Turkey and the kingdom. However, it is too early to see any change in [the Egyptian governments’] hostility to the Brotherhood. . . .

An improved relationship between Saudi Arabia and Turkey, even if it is intended to curb Iran’s strengthening position in the region, is not necessarily a positive development for Israel. In light of the crisis between Israel and Turkey, Ankara’s entry into the Saudi-led Sunni coalition can increase the points of friction between the coalition and Israel. The pragmatic relationship that aligned Israel with the moderate Sunni states can be harmed, unless Israel and Saudi Arabia understand how to maintain the delicate channel of quiet coordination between them.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.