A representative of the Anne Frank Trust, a British-Jewish charity, has agreed to participate on a panel alongside Abdurraheem Green, a prominent anti-Semitic Islamist preacher. To make matters worse, the event is part of Green’s campaign to present the organization he runs as respectable. Samuel Westrop writes:

Green has spoken of a “Yehudi . . . stench” and urged Muslims to “push [the Jews] to the side.” In addition, he encourages men to hit their wives to “bring them to goodness,” and has called for the killing of homosexuals and adulterers.

The event on May 21 is part of a broader “anti-racism” campaign launched by . . . [Green’s] Islamic Education and Research Academy (iERA), . . . [which] describes itself as “a global [proselytizing] organization” that works “to empower Muslims as individuals and local communities to invite and inform people about Islam.” In truth, the iERA is one of Britain’s most extreme Islamist groups. . . . In 2013, five members of an iERA youth group . . . left for Syria to join the Islamic State terrorist group. . . .

Well-intentioned activists often treat the notion of “dialogue” as an unassailable good. More often than not, however, Islamist groups merely regard these activists as useful dupes on whom to advance extremist agendas. Unfortunately, as history shows, providing extremists with a platform only serves to legitimize “anti-racism” and interfaith initiatives that openly promote illiberal and anti-democratic agendas.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.