In light of the collapse of Syria, which controlled the Golan Heights until 1967, Zvi Hauser argues that there is no longer any reason for Israel not to claim full sovereignty over the territory (free registration required):

The validity of the arrangements that defined the borders and the countries in the Middle East after World War I has expired, and the region can now expect many years of instability. In such a situation, Israel must reformulate its geostrategic interests. . . .

Israel can, and must, separate the international discussion about the Golan Heights from the discussion of Judea and Samaria. As opposed to the West Bank, on the Golan there is no [fundamental problem] of ruling another people; the 22,000 Druze who are fortunate enough to live on the Israeli side of the Golan Heights are entitled to full Israeli citizenship. Nor is there a “demographic problem” there: the region has a Jewish majority, with some 25,000 Jewish residents. Above all, there is no alternative to Israeli rule on the Golan, even in the long term.

There should now be a process of “coordinating expectations” with the international community . . . in an overall context of stabilizing the region. Neither Islamic State, nor the jihadists of Nusra Front and al-Qaeda, nor a crude foothold of [the] Iran-Hizballah-Assad [axis] . . . will enable the stabilization and rehabilitation of the region. There is no horizon on the Golan Heights other than the Israeli one.

The imminent nuclear agreement with Iran—which is a bad deal—also creates a concrete opportunity to discuss the issue. It is doubtful whether Israel can influence the signing of the agreement, but it can exert real influence in the “discussion on compensation.” . . . The balancing formula in light of the Iranian achievement (and Assad’s murderous behavior) must include a maximum reduction in the danger of Iranian nuclearization, along with containment of Iran’s potential for conventional aggression. This can be done by creating an international agreement to . . . shelve the Shiite-Alawite aspiration to regain control of the Israeli Golan, which constitutes less than 1 percent of the area of what used to be Syria.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.