While Moncef Marzouki, the former president of Tunisia, was on a boat that was attempting to run the Israeli naval blockade of Gaza, one of his countrymen murdered 37 beachgoers. David Horovitz wonders why, exactly, Marzouki was so concerned with Gaza:

[E]ven as it has sought to shift toward democratic stability, Tunisia is widely reported to have provided more recruits for Islamic extremist groups, most emphatically including Islamic State, than any other nation on earth. That river of recruitment was flowing full speed during the three years of the Marzouki presidency.

As the Israeli navy escorts him into port, has the former president of the world’s largest supplier of Islamic extremists paused for thought? Has he engaged in a little introspection? How has the news of [the recent] act of barbarism been affecting him? . . .

[O]n the very weekend that a young Tunisian man, poisoned by benighted zealots, gunned down dozens of innocents in the country Marzouki used to run, here he was sailing the high seas on behalf of [Hamas], an Islamic extremist organization, strategically engaged in poisoning young minds and bent on dispatching its recruits to carry out murder. Does the president see the appalling irony? Probably not.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.