Over the past month, stories have appeared in the press about retired Israeli security officials expressing support for the Iranian nuclear deal. Now there are claims that an IDF intelligence assessment, not yet released to the public, also defends the agreement. The claims, writes Martin Kramer, are “politicized nonsense”:

Not everyone with a pension and an opinion is equal. Most of the people who argue that Israel should not fight the agreement still think it’s a bad one; they simply believe there is no point in provoking President Obama when the deal will inevitably be approved and implemented. This argument is not the same as supporting the deal—it is resigned acquiescence. . . . .

But what about [the] claim of “game-changing” assessments issued by current intelligence officials? . . . [T]he intelligence assessment is that Iran won’t be able to build a bomb under the terms of the agreement. (That is, if Iran doesn’t cheat—the assessment says the mechanisms for inspection are flawed.) Iran might even show short-term restraint in terms of its support of terrorism to consolidate its gains from sanctions relief. But the estimate also holds that when the agreement expires, Iran will be only weeks away from a nuclear breakout.

In the meantime, Iran will have gained undeserved legitimacy from the deal. . . . The bottom line of the assessment, as reported in the press, is that the risks of the deal outweigh the opportunities. [T]he “eruption of dissent” [from Netanyahu’s position] is imaginary.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.