Earlier this month, the IDF took the unprecedented step of releasing a document outlining its updated strategic doctrines. Gabi Siboni explains why the report and its content matter:

The publication of The IDF Strategy [is in itself] a milestone in the relationship between the military and the civilian populations, and it is impossible to overstate the importance of the transparency manifested by the very publication of the document. . . .

In the most recent campaigns in Lebanon (2006) and Gaza (2009, 2011, 2014), the IDF took action according to the “erosion” principle: even if not articulated explicitly, the IDF used the idea of reducing the enemy’s force as its guiding principle. Thus, the IDF used increasingly larger amounts of firepower to target the enemy’s capabilities and operational infrastructures. This principle took a toll on the Israeli home front, manifested in an extended combat period, during which the enemy continued to maintain its ability to fire rockets and missiles. The enemy, unconcerned about its own survival, could remain impervious to the scope of the destruction and damage wrought by the IDF.

The new IDF document presents an essentially different approach to action: in response to provocations, the IDF will attack the enemy using integrated capabilities, immediately and simultaneously. The ground maneuver is given importance in its updated role, which is to penetrate enemy territory rapidly in order to damage the survivability of the enemy’s governing bodies and destroy its military infrastructures. . . . These actions will be supported by special operations, cyber operations, high-quality intelligence, and the most effective defenses possible against enemy fire.

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”