Amos Yadlin and Carmit Valensi argue that although Vladimir Putin’s precise goals in Syria are unclear, he either intends to maintain Bashar al-Assad’s control over all or part of the country or to replace him with someone who will remain loyal to existing alliances with Russia and Iran. None of these outcomes serves Israel’s interests:

If once there was hope that the [Syrian] regime would collapse in the course of events, without Israeli intervention, Russia’s active support for Assad weakens the chances of ousting him. . . . Russian involvement underscores the need to examine the issue at the systemic level rather than at the level of individual actors. The system—the radical axis—includes Iran, Syria, and Hizballah, with Russia, at least for now, seen as [its] sponsor. Hizballah’s leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has stressed the stability of the Assad regime as a condition for the survival of the radical axis. . . .

The members of the radical axis and Russia share intelligence and a systemic rationale, providing a foundation for coordination between the Russian aerial force and Iran-Syria-Hizballah ground forces. If [Assad remains in power], Israel will find itself in an inferior strategic position because Russia’s involvement is liable to provide a seal of approval for Iranian activity in Syria in years to come, as well as for Hizballah forces armed with the best of Russia’s weapons on Syrian soil. . . .

Israel must gear up for active efforts to topple Assad, based on the understanding that, beyond the moral imperative, Assad’s ouster will lead to a strategic loss for Iran and Hizballah in the bleeding Syrian state.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.