Why Did Turkey Shoot Down a Russian Plane?

It is hard to believe, argues Henri Barkey, that Turkish pilots downed a Russian plane without getting approval from the upper echelons of the country’s military—or, indeed, civilian—leadership. Barkey speculates as to the decision’s motivation and its likely consequences:

The Turks seemed particularly upset at the Russian bombardment of their allies, the anti-Assad Turkmen militia. Turkey has invested a lot of support in this militia; President Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly admitted that they had been supplying it with arms. Another worrying factor for Ankara was the growing post-Paris consensus to prioritize the fight against Islamic State at the expense of the fight against Bashar al-Assad, which has always been Turkey’s primary focus. Finally, the mood in the West regarding Putin’s bullying tactics, from Ukraine to Syria, had turned sour.

Still, even if the Turks were confident of NATO support and correctly judged the growing Putin fatigue in the West, this remains too risky a decision for any country to take. The decision requires a great deal of self-confidence, as well as an element of risk-taking. All this points to Erdogan, who possesses both of these attributes.

Turkey may now realize that it has overplayed its hand. Erdogan, who initially said there was nothing to apologize for, is now saying that if [the Turkish military] knew it was a Russian plane it would probably have acted differently. Erdogan likely changed his tune because Putin didn’t lose any time in retaliating against Turkish interests: Turkish convoys in Syria delivering supplies to the opposition have been bombed, Turkish businessmen have been denied entry at the Moscow airport, tourism packages are being cancelled. . . . Eventually the tensions will subside, but for the moment two mercurial leaders are confronting one another. How long the confrontation will last depends on their particular calculations.

Read more at American Interest

More about: ISIS, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Russia, Syrian civil war, Turkey, Vladimir Putin

 

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security