The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) establishes what it calls a “procurement channel”: a series of procedures and regulations for monitoring and restricting Iran’s purchase of goods that could be used for the illicit development of nuclear technology. In theory, write David Albright and Andrea Stricker, these procedures allow the U.S. and other concerned parties to stop suspicious purchases before they are completed. In practice, however, the procedures are riddled with complexities and obstructions. What’s more, Albright and Stricker argue, Russia and China have already begun to exploit the deal’s weaknesses:

Given the short time frames to act to block a [proposed purchase], efficiency and speed in the process are critical. According to P5+1 officials, Russia attempted to exploit the lack of clarity about procurement-channel rules and functions to weaken [the JCPOA’s] effectiveness, and has been supported by China in some of those endeavors. One official accused Russia of attempting to manipulate the whole process. Russia’s action may also polarize decision making at the Procurement Working Group (PWG) [the international committee tasked with implementing the procurement-channel regulations] by creating de-facto voting blocs, with Russia, China, and Iran on one side and the United States, Britain, France, and Germany on the other. Russia’s role overall appears to be to complicate the rejection of [procurement requests] within the tight guidelines imposed by the JCPOA and isolate certain sensitive exports from the procurement-channel process. . . .

[Furthermore], Iran has tried to argue, with Russian support, that anything military-related is not the business of the PWG. This argument in essence states that the PWG does not have jurisdiction over any imports by Iran’s military or missile industries, all of which need a considerable amount of dual-use equipment. Iran appears to be arguing that it will seek to buy banned equipment under a civilian cover, and if caught by the PWG, the PWG can only send the issue to the UN Security Council for a decision. It cannot stop the sale on its own authority.

Of course, the United States would be expected to block any approval for a sale at the Security Council. So, in that sense, the Iranian effort will not be successful. But Iran, with Russian support, may be seeking to reduce the PWG’s credibility internationally and hinder its operations.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.