While a popular adage states that bullets can’t kill ideas, they can prove quite effective, argues Dennis Ross, when it comes to the ideas of Islamic State (IS)—especially if coupled with savvy use of social media and a change in policy toward Iran:

Islamic State claims to have a divine mandate. Suffering military defeats can demonstrate the hollowness of this claim. Presently, [the U.S. is] rolling it back in both Iraq and Syria. Unfortunately, until [America and its allies] undo the group’s greatest symbolic victories—its seizure of Mosul in Iraq and the establishment of a capital in Raqqa, Syria—its image of success will remain. [Taking away] the symbols of these achievements is thus essential and would be impossible [for IS] to hide.

There are other means for exposing the fraudulent nature of the group’s claims, and here social media can play a role. . . Why not showcase those surrendering on social media? What kind of divine messengers surrender? Similarly, put defectors on social-media platforms and let them tell the story of the brutality, injustice, exploitation of women, and corrupt and arbitrary nature of rule in IS-controlled territory.

IS [also] claims it is the protector of Sunni Muslims against the non-believers and . . . Shiite Muslims. If nothing else, this tells us that Iran cannot be a partner in discrediting IS. On the contrary, its role in the mass killing of Sunnis in Syria has contributed to the rise of IS. We need the Sunnis—clerics, tribes, and governments—to discredit and replace IS on the ground. . . . Our problem in getting Sunnis to take on this role is that our priority in Syria and Iraq is IS—while Iran, the Shiite militias, and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad are the Sunni preoccupations. . . . The next president must understand this complicated reality and use our readiness to counter Iran in the region to gain leverage and influence to move the Sunnis to make IS their priority as well as ours.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.