Yesterday, Israel and Turkey publicized the details of their agreement to restore diplomatic relations. In order to achieve a deal, the two governments had to give up key demands: Ankara’s insistence that Jerusalem end the blockade on Gaza and Jerusalem’s insistence that Ankara expel Hamas from its borders. Yoni Ben Menachem writes:

On issues regarding the Gaza Strip, Hamas and Turkey have been closely collaborating since [2010]. The alliance between them stems from the common ideology of Hamas and Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party, both affiliates of the worldwide Muslim Brotherhood movement. . . . Throughout the talks with Israel on normalizing relations, Turkey constantly updated Hamas and consulted with it. . . .

Hamas is portraying Turkey’s rebuff of Israel’s demand to close Hamas’s office in Istanbul as a [victory]. Although the office will remain open, according to Israeli sources, Turkey promised Israel that the office will instigate no further terror attacks on it.

According to Israeli security officials, it was this office that activated the terror gang that kidnapped and murdered three Israeli teenage boys near Hebron in the summer of 2014, as well as the terror gang that murdered Eitam and Naama Henkin near Nablus at the end of last year. . . .

Hamas officials say that Turkey will play a further role after signing the normalization agreement with Israel. In the next stage, Turkey is supposed to try and mediate a long-term ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, as well as a prisoner exchange in which four Israelis (or their bodies) held by Hamas will be released in return for Palestinian terrorists held by Israel.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.