Islamic State’s Bloody Ramadan, and What It Means

Islamic State, like many terrorist groups, takes the Muslim holy month of Ramadan as an especially propitious time for murder. As this particular Ramadan draws to a close, IS-linked attacks have cumulatively claimed over 300 dead in Orlando, Istanbul, Dhaka, Baghdad, and Saudi Arabia. Max Boot draws some conclusions from this latest wave of bloodshed:

A common refrain . . . has been that these attacks are [a] response to the territorial losses that IS has recently suffered. . . . [A]nalysts and U.S. government officials suggest that IS is trying show it is still relevant by expanding operations outside its core “caliphate.” That may well be the case. Or it may be that IS has been planning a campaign of terrorist attacks abroad all along and would have carried them out whether it was losing ground or not. We simply don’t know enough to offer a definitive answer.

The fact remains that, even in its currently weakened condition, IS is the most potent terrorist group on earth—indeed, perhaps the strongest in history. . . . It has the potential to wreak havoc for years to come, in whatever form it takes. Obviously it would be greatly advantageous to destroy its physical control of territory in Iraq and Syria—this is what makes possible its huge stream of income (which comes from “taxation” of the people under its control and various criminal rackets, as well as oil production) and provides it with space to train and indoctrinate recruits. It also contributes to the aura of success that has been such a big part of its allure for would-be terrorists around the world.

But while destroying the caliphate will undoubtedly diminish the IS threat, it probably won’t eliminate that threat. Like al-Qaeda, of which it was once an affiliate, IS shows a dismaying ability to adapt to adversity. . . .

[And] even if the IS threat is eventually diminished, other terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda wait in the wings. Indeed, the greatest beneficiaries of the anti-IS campaign in Iraq and Syria may be other Sunni and Shiite terrorist organizations that are eager to rush into the vacuum.

Read more at Commentary

More about: Al Qaeda, ISIS, Politics & Current Affairs, Ramadan, War on Terror

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF