In 2014, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) ruled that Israel should be considered an occupying power in Gaza, despite the fact that every Israeli soldier and civilian was removed nine years earlier. The ICC’s conclusion is frequently echoed by various UN bodies as well as journalists and politicians; as Gilead Sher and Dana Wolf explain, it is patently absurd:

Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations outlines legal requirements for occupation, which include the physical existence of hostile troops in an area, so that the legitimate government is incapable of exercising effective powers of government. Conversely, military withdrawal is a prerequisite for clearly demarcating the end of occupation. As such, never since the enactment of the Hague Regulations has an occupation been recognized without a foreign army present. [Yet] the international community still erroneously perceives the [Gaza] Strip as a territory under Israel’s responsibility, . . . without consideration of the fact that Israel does not meet the basic criteria of an “occupier” under international law. . . .

This is why the international community should intervene and amend the legal distortion that has been perpetuated since Israel’s disengagement from Gaza. It should explicitly declare that Israel’s occupation of Gaza has ended. In exchange for such a formal declaration, Israel should [offer to] join the international effort to rehabilitate Gaza under careful security measures, [with] international coordination and supervision. Israel could further propose that if, as a result of successful rehabilitation, Hamas’s attacks on Israel subside for an extended period, it would seriously consider the alleviation of the closure of the Strip in coordination with Egypt, and the construction of a Gaza seaport. Everyone would benefit except the terrorist groups in Gaza.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.