Although there may be some short-term disruption in trade with Israel due to Great Britain’s decision to leave the EU, and the Jewish state will lose an important ally within the European Union, James Sorene believes there may also be long-term benefits:

The UK is Israel’s second-largest trading partner; bilateral trade is worth £5 billion a year and has doubled in the last decade. . . . Britain will need to negotiate a separate trade agreement with Israel as Israel’s association agreement with the EU will no longer apply. If the UK falls into recession, bilateral trade could decrease in value as UK consumers spend less money. But there could be enhanced terms for some Israeli exports, especially agricultural produce, to the UK market once it leaves the EU.

The impact of Brexit on the EU’s policy toward Israel is debatable. In the past, the UK has [sometimes] been an important moderating voice, but often falls in line with common EU positions. The UK will no longer be present for these debates, so Israel will look to other allies in the EU such as Germany. While the UK was a very significant player in EU foreign policy, Israel has been building up relations with several countries in Eastern Europe and most recently became significantly closer to Greece and Cyprus.

In the longer term, the UK’s foreign policy could rebalance away from Europe and gravitate more to U.S. positions. Britain may feel the need to rebut any suggestion of diminished influence by taking more of a lead on the global stage. The UK has a very large foreign-aid budget and the best armed forces in Europe. It has committed significant resources to the fight against Islamic State and shares common strategic interests with Israel. None of this work is connected to EU membership, but is a function of the UK’s military and intelligence capability and its existing alliances in the Middle East.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.