In response to revelations that the U.S. delivered $400 million in cash to Iran on the same day that Tehran released five American hostages, the White House has insisted that the money was just “leverage” and not ransom, that the payment and hostage release were frankly disclosed by the president in a January 17 press conference, and that the payment was the wholly unobjectionable remittance of funds owed to Iran since the 1970s. Not only do these claims stretch the limits of credibility, writes Rick Richman, but the American government also seems to be ignoring its forthright legal obligation to pursue the claims of victims of Iranian terror:

[At the January 17 press conference, President Obama] did not disclose that the payment had been made in untraceable foreign cash; nor that it had been delivered . . . to an Iranian airline sanctioned for its connections to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); nor that the IRGC may thus have gained control of the cash; nor that the administration lifted sanctions on the airline only the day before; nor that the administration had specifically linked the payment with the release; nor that the release and the payment had been virtually simultaneous. . . .

[Furthermore], in a January 29 letter to Secretary of State [John] Kerry and Treasury Secretary [Jack] Lew, Senator Roy Blunt . . . noted that American courts had found Iran liable for bombings of our embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983, the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and other terror attacks. He cited a finding by the Congressional Research Service that there were some $43.5 billion in unpaid Iranian judgments. He questioned why the administration paid Iran $1.7 billion [of which the $400 million was but the first installment] while those judgments remained outstanding, given the provisions of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act [of] 2000.

[That act] . . . directed that “no funds shall be paid to Iran . . . from the Foreign Military Sales Fund [FMS] until such claims [against Iran awarded by U.S. courts] have been dealt with to the satisfaction of the United States.” Senator Blunt’s letter stated that the damages in the cases against Iran “far exceed[ed] the $400 million” in Iran’s FMS account. . . .

[I]f the amount in Iran’s FMS account was far less than the U.S. claims against Iran under VTVPA, why was there any payment to Iran at all?

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.