It’s bad enough, argues Aaron David Miller, that the Obama administration paid $400 million to Iran in exchange for the release of hostages, concealed and denied the fact that it did so, and probably handed over the funds in violation of U.S. law. But something even more important is at stake:

In the Middle East, strength and negotiating acumen are prized; they demonstrate power and credibility. And the region tends to consider actions and strategy in a time frame that stretches far beyond the four- and eight-year scale of U.S. politics. Meanwhile, the Obama administration’s handling of Iran in this situation plays into the narrative that the U.S. is weak and feckless and behaving as if it doesn’t know what it’s doing. . . .

Meanwhile, the Obama administration is tripping over itself trying to explain how and why it didn’t pay ransom as Iranian hard-liners contend that that is precisely what happened—adding to the perception that Washington was played and is violating its own pledge of not bargaining for imprisoned Americans.

All of this feeds into an image of U.S. policy fundamentally constrained by a changing region, one that seems beyond Washington’s willingness and capacity to manage. The central actor in this new landscape is a rising Iran, willing to sacrifice much for its vital interests.

What can be hard to keep in mind in all the back-and-forth is that Iran isn’t ten-feet tall—its regime has its own constraints in Syria and Iraq. But in a region of weak Arab states, alongside a Russia willing to assert its power, and a Washington constrained by a nuclear accord that has expanded Iran’s ambitions, Tehran is a force to be reckoned with. This will be the case even more when the constraints on its nuclear program begin to sunset in a few years. At which point cash-for-prisoners may end up being the least of U.S. concerns.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.