Over the past eight years, America has been steadily disengaging from the Middle East. Among the results, writes Efraim Inbar, are Iranian regional ascendancy, the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation, the rise of Islamic State, an emboldened Russia, and bloody chaos in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. And then there are the consequences for Israel:

The perception that Washington will come to Israel’s aid in times of need has been a longstanding and important component of Jerusalem’s ability to project a deterrent threat. The new perception of the U.S. administration as a vacillating ally damages that deterrent capability. In addition, Washington’s attempt to compensate its Arab allies for the Iranian nuclear deal by providing them with the latest state-of-the-art weapons erodes Israel’s qualitative advantage.

[But] the U.S. exit from the Middle East ironically also increases Israel’s leeway to do as it sees fit. It is burdened with less of an obligation to weigh the consequences of its own actions on U.S. interests and personnel in the region. Moreover, if the next American administration employs the logic of “offshore balancing,” whereby one country uses favored regional powers to check the rise of potentially hostile powers, Washington’s dependence on Jerusalem is likely to increase, as Israel is the strongest and friendliest military power in a highly volatile region.

Lastly, Washington’s disengagement from the Middle East appears to close the book on the longstanding U.S. support for liberty and for democratic movements around the globe. It undermines the relatively small and weak pro-democratic forces in the Arab world, which need greater U.S. involvement and support for their causes. . . .

For the time being, there is no alternative to a responsible and well calibrated U.S. role in world affairs. An assertive U.S. position is also important for spreading the values for which [America] stands—democracy and the free market. Abdicating this role is simply irresponsible.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.