Earlier this month, Nusra Front, the main al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, renamed itself Jabhat Fath al-Sham in a public statement that, on its face, would indicate a break with its parent organization. This fits neatly with the conventional wisdom that al-Qaeda has become a second-tier player, unable to keep up with the more popular and powerful Islamic State (IS). But, argue Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, the conventional wisdom is wrong: al-Qaeda has routed Islamic State in Africa, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan while establishing important footholds in Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere; meanwhile, the renaming of Nusra Front was likely mostly for show:

Rather than trying to replicate IS’s model, al-Qaeda took the exact opposite approach. Al-Qaeda reduced its public profile, downplayed its successes rather than publicizing them, and embedded further within local populations. In this way, al-Qaeda presented itself to the world as a more palatable alternative to its bloodthirsty rival. . . .

Even when IS was at its peak, the vast majority of al-Qaeda affiliates refused to defect, and instead hunted down and neutralized IS sympathizers. Now that IS is demonstrably losing territory in Syria, Iraq, and Libya all at once, its chances of wooing al-Qaeda affiliates are even further diminished. It is IS’s global network, not al-Qaeda’s, that is now vulnerable to fragmentation. . . .

The alleged dissociation from al-Qaeda [in Syria] may open up [the newly minted] Jabhat Fath al-Sham to deeper cooperation with other rebel groups and greater support from external sponsors. Al-Qaeda theoreticians have made clear that they expect this precise benefit. . . .

Today al-Qaeda seems to be the strongest it has been since 9/11, and is arguably in the best shape it has known in its history.

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”