Last week, an Israeli news network announced the finding of substantial evidence that the Palestinian Authority president had been recruited by Soviet intelligence during the 1980s and that his handler was none other than Mikhail Bogdanov—currently Vladimir Putin’s envoy to the Middle East at a time when Russia is intervening to broker talks between Israel and the Palestinians. Jonathan Tobin considers the significance of these revelations:

If the PA leader were to confound observers and summon up the courage to embrace peace and recognize the legitimacy of a Jewish state no matter its borders, then nothing in his past would prevent him from obtaining extensive concessions from the current Israeli government or any possible successor. . . .

[T]he connection with the anti-Semitic Soviet leadership was always more than an alliance of convenience for men like [Yasir] Arafat and Abbas. . . .

[Likewise], the rejectionism of the Palestinians wasn’t merely a strategy but an expression of their identity. Their [leaders’ sense of] national purpose was and still is inextricably linked to their century-old war against the Zionists. If men like Abbas can’t rise above their sordid past and make peace, it is not just a matter of habit, but also a natural consequence of the political culture steeped in hate that they have helped create.

Being a former Soviet agent doesn’t prevent Abbas from making peace. But it does supply a partial explanation for why he refuses to do it.

Surveying news websites and social media on Sunday morning, I immediately found some intelligent and well-informed observers arguing that Iran deliberately warned the U.S. of its pending assault on Israel, and calibrated it so that there would be few casualties and minimal destructiveness, thus hoping to avoid major retaliation. In other words, this massive barrage was a face-saving gesture by the ayatollahs. Others disagreed. Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan put the issue to rest:

The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect. The attack caused more limited damage than intended likely because the Iranians underestimated the tremendous advantages Israel has in defending against such strikes compared with Ukraine.

But that isn’t to say that Tehran achieved nothing:

The lessons that Iran will draw from this attack will allow it to build more successful strike packages in the future. The attack probably helped Iran identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli air-defense system. Iran will likely also share the lessons it learned in this attack with Russia.

Iran’s ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses with even a small number of large ballistic missiles presents serious security concerns for Israel. The only Iranian missiles that got through hit an Israeli military base, limiting the damage, but a future strike in which several ballistic missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and hit Tel Aviv or Haifa could cause significant civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including ports and energy. . . . Israel and its partners should not emerge from this successful defense with any sense of complacency.