While Ahmad Khan Rahami might have planted the bombs in Manhattan and New Jersey on his own, he did not plan his attack or “become radicalized” simply by reading jihadist propaganda online, as Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson and others have implied. Matthew Levitt explains:

The . . . fundamental problem with references to “lone wolves” . . . is that the term is largely a misnomer. Since wolves are pack animals, “lone wolf” is meant to conjure up the image of someone who has rejected his nature and is now acting completely independently—a rogue individual operating outside the scope of any cell, network, or group. But while there are cases of individuals . . . who attack on their own with no formal ties to any group, those rare cases are the exceptions that prove the rule. More often than not, evidence indicates that suspects thought to have been lone wolves might more accurately be described as known wolves—people whose radicalization, suspicious travel, and changes in behavior were observed by acquaintances.

That already appears to be the case with Rahami. He apparently traveled to Pakistan in 2005 and then again for three months in 2011. More recently, he lived in Quetta—home of the Afghan Taliban Shura Council—for nearly a year until March 2014; a younger brother said he had also visited Afghanistan during that time. . . .

It’s not just the pattern of his travels that suggests Rahami’s radicalization wasn’t primarily mediated by the Internet. Based on the sophistication of the bombs Rahami purportedly constructed, authorities suspect he received some sort of personalized explosives training. . . .

Rahami may turn out to be a lone offender, but he is unlikely to be a truly lone wolf. . . . And given the evidence available so far, he may have more to do with al-Qaeda—the persistent terrorist group many have already forgotten—than with the still dangerous but now decaying Islamic State.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.