Surveying the relationship between ground and air combat in Israeli strategy from the War of Independence until the present, and examining the threats currently facing the Jewish state, Eado Hecht and Eitan Shamir argue that Israel is overly reliant on airpower and long-range artillery, and needs to expand its ability to operate on land. In particular, they see the IDF as unready for “medium-intensity warfare” with organizations like Hizballah, Nusra Front, or Islamic State (IS). There is also the very real possibility that Hamas could imitate IS or Nusra Front tactics by trying to conduct large-scale, simultaneous raids deep into Israeli territory:

[O]ver the past five years, the IDF has disbanded six armored brigades, two artillery brigades, and an undisclosed number of rear-area security battalions—one more step in an ongoing, drastic decrease of ground-force combat power. When viewed in conjunction with statements by senior officers expressing doubt as to the net worth of offensive ground operations, these reductions cast doubt on the seriousness of the military’s commitment to conducting them. . . .

In [response to possible attacks by Hamas, Hizballah, or other organizations], the Israeli government might be compelled to order a ground offensive. . . . [T]o conduct an effective ground operation, the IDF will need the tactical capability to cross, clear, and cover large tracts of ground, some of it hilly and wooded; capture and clear numerous built-up areas of various sizes; and search for tunnels and other hidden storage sites—and do it all while being fired at by mortars and long-range anti-tank missiles, ambushed by infantry with small arms and personal anti-tank rockets, mines, booby-traps, and remote-controlled explosives, and counter-attacked by infantry units as well as suicide bombers and suicide-bomber vehicles while overcoming a variety of natural and artificial obstacles.

[T]he IDF was surprised in Lebanon in 2006 and in Gaza in 2014 by the intensity of enemy resistance. In future, the IDF must assume this level of resistance at a minimum. Actually, as potential enemies are gaining considerable combat experience, an even higher level of intensity and competence should be assumed. Even though Israel’s current enemies are not as big, well-armed, or well-trained as the Egyptian and former Syrian armies, they must be considered not merely as guerrillas but as trained armies. To defeat them will require the application of regular-warfare tactics adapted to the specific circumstances.

All this, write Hecht and Shamir, will require significantly larger ground forces than Israel can presently field.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.