To understand the Islamic Republic’s current attempt to establish its hegemony over the Middle East, writes Hanin Ghaddar, one must understand Hizballah, which plays a pivotal role in Iranian strategy. And to understand Hizballah, one must understand its Shiite “sacred narrative,” according to which its wars with Israel, Syrian rebels, and Sunni Muslims more generally—collectively termed “resistance”—are part of an ongoing struggle to reverse a 7th-century Shiite defeat by the early Sunnis for supremacy over Islam. This, combined with the idea that Iran’s supreme leader has pope-like authority over the world’s Shiites, and with its provision of social services to the poor, has won Hizballah the hearts and minds of much of Lebanon’s Shiite population. Yet even as Iran’s network of alliances is at the peak of its power, Hizballah is in danger of losing its popularity:

As the Syrian conflict raged, the sacred narrative remained. . . . Besides claiming to defend Shiite towns and shrines, Hizballah started marketing its involvement as necessary to defend Shiite power and even the community’s very existence against the [Sunnis]. . . . But as casualties mounted in Syria, the Shiite community began to realize that the sacred narrative is not always a recipe for victory.

Before the war in Syria, Hizballah fighters and their supporters believed in resistance as a personal goal. . . . But that is not the case today. Hizballah’s fighters no longer have an immediate and personal cause to fight for; they have become proxies for foreign powers. . . . Hizballah is still using its narrative of existential threat, but its fighters are there for the money. [Joining the organization] is now the only option for many poor Shiites who have lost the opportunity to work in Sunni states because of Hizballah’s sectarian rhetoric and isolation. . . .

But the main issue that is directly affecting the Shiite community is Hizballah’s [own] money problems. Iran is still providing funds to Hizballah, but it is also financing other Shiite militias in the region, primarily in Iraq. Hizballah has been forced to reallocate more funds to its military operations in Syria, leading to a serious decline in social services. Without these services, popular support for the terrorist group has weakened. . . .

Moreover, Hizballah fighters are having a hard time working with Iranian officials on the ground. . . . They have been surprised by the Iranians’ weak military skills, discovering that they depend on Hizballah for protection. They were disappointed with the Iranians’ attitude, which they felt was arrogant and condescending. They feel the Iranians don’t care when a Lebanese or an Iraqi dies. . . . Hizballah fighters are starting to understand that this is a relationship between a superior and his subordinates, and that they are mercenaries, not heroes.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.