In 1968, Israeli military intelligence suspected that Egypt was already making preparations for its next war on the Jewish state. But monitoring these preparations—many of which took place just a few hundred yards from the border—required a risky covert operation. Shabtai Brill, a senior intelligence officer at the time, felt there had to be a better way. Inspired by a newsreel he had seen about an American boy who had received a miniature remote-control airplane as a bar-mitzvah present, he arrived at the idea behind drone warfare. Yaakov Katz and Amir Bohbot write:

Brill . . . went to air-force headquarters, snooped around, and discovered Shlomo Barak, an officer who spent his weekends flying remote-control airplanes. He was one of a handful of people in Israel at the time who had the necessary experience for what Brill had in mind.

Brill tried to get the air force to assume responsibility for the idea. He was unsuccessful. “Remote-control planes are toys, and we have no use for them,” officers from the air force’s technology branch told Brill. . . .

Later that week, [Brill and his commanding officer, Avraham Arnan] met at a small airstrip outside Tel Aviv for a flight demonstration. Barak piloted the remote-control plane, did some maneuvers, a flip or two, and landed it flawlessly. Arnan liked the idea but wanted to know what it would cost. Brill didn’t know and, so, together with Barak, he compiled a list: three airplanes, six remote controls, five engines, a few spare tires, and propellers. The grand total: $850.

Arnan approved the budget, and a member of Israel’s defense delegation in New York went to a Manhattan toy store, purchased the equipment, and sent it back to Israel in the embassy’s diplomatic pouch. . . . After their safe arrival in Israel, the planes were brought to the Intelligence Directorate’s technological team for further development. They were fitted with 35-millimeter German-made cameras with timers programmed to take pictures automatically every ten seconds.

Brill and Arnan then had the planes go up against IDF anti-aircraft batteries, which proved unable to hit a target so small. Soon they were flying reconnaissance missions over Egypt and returning with photographs of Egyptian positions far more detailed than anything human spies could deliver. But as efforts to build more sophisticated drones stalled, the IDF brass shut down the program. Only after the Yom Kippur War was Brill able to convince his superiors that the Egyptian invasion could have been properly anticipated had unmanned surveillance continued.

Thereafter, Israel began developing ever more sophisticated drones, using them against Syrian artillery in Lebanon, underground rocket-launchers in Gaza, and Iranian arms smugglers in Sudan. Sharing these new weapons with the U.S. initiated the current era of Israeli-American cooperation in the development of military technology.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.