The Islamic Republic is in possession of the Middle East’s largest arsenal of missiles, most of which are of the short- and medium-range ballistic variety, and many of which could be equipped with a nuclear warhead. In addition, the Iranian proxy Hizballah has its own massive stockpile of rockets. As Michael Eisenstadt explains, missiles play a crucial role in Tehran’s strategic thinking, and pose a number of dangers:

[T]he recent nuclear accord with Iran . . . did not impose new constraints on Iran’s missile program. On the contrary, it loosened [existing ones]—and included provisions for their lifting in eight years, if not sooner. Iran’s missile force could double or triple in size by the time the major limits imposed [on its nuclear program] by the deal are lifted fifteen years from now. By then, Iran’s growing missile and cyberwarfare capabilities will pose major challenges to regional missile defenses, military and critical-infrastructure targets, and civilian population centers. This would make preventive action by Israel or the United States, in the event of an attempted Iranian nuclear breakout, much more costly.

[Furthermore], an Iranian nuclear missile force would be highly destabilizing. Short missile-flight times between Iran and Israel, the lack of reliable crisis-communication channels, and the impossibility of knowing whether incoming Iranian missiles are conventional or nuclear could someday spur Israel—and any other regional nuclear states that emerge in the interim—to adopt a launch-on-warning posture, undermining the prospects for a stable nuclear deterrent balance in the region.

[Already, Iran has established a “deterrence triad” that ] rests on its ability to: (1) threaten navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, (2) undertake unilateral and proxy terrorist attacks on multiple continents, and (3) conduct long-range strikes using its own missiles or by way of long-range rockets and short-range missiles in the hands of proxies such as Hizballah. Iran’s growing cyberwarfare capabilities may eventually become a fourth leg of this deterrent/warfighting triad, enabling it to strike at adversaries and to project power globally, instantaneously, and on a sustained basis, in ways it cannot in the physical domain.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.