Israel’s unprecedented military operation against Iran was comprehensive, surgical, and strategically devastating. Multiple waves of precision airstrikes, combined with meticulously planned covert ground actions, dismantled much of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, and decapitated its Revolutionary Guard Corps and military leadership. While many of those who understand the evils of the Islamic Republic of Iran have responded with euphoria and talk of a “new Middle East,” prudence demands caution. Enthusiasm obscures deeper complexities, and transformative moments rarely unfold according to our most optimistic visions. What emerges from the current military campaign will surely not reflect the simplistic fantasies of the moment, but rather the shifting realities of regional politics and enduring patterns of Arab geopolitical behavior.

There should be little doubt that leaders, diplomats, and strategists across Arab Gulf capitals have hardly slept since Friday, not merely from heightened alertness, but from sheer euphoria. For decades, Iran has cast an ominous shadow over their strategic calculations, an enduring threat they knew they were unable to deter or even meaningfully to contain. Israel’s actions, swift and deadly, have effectively liberated the Gulf states from this menacing constraint. With a single stroke, the geopolitical framework that had severely restricted Arab Gulf states’ horizons for decades has collapsed, fundamentally redefining their strategic landscape

It would be natural to hope that the Gulf states, free of the Iranian threat and full of appreciation for what Israel can deliver, would at last embrace the Jewish state enthusiastically. Many pundits responded almost immediately to the Israeli attacks with hopeful predictions of a new era of Arab-Israeli amity. Unfortunately, such predictions are premature. It is much more likely that, despite private admiration and cooperation, public acknowledgment and overt alignment with Israel will remain restrained. Arab regimes will undoubtedly deepen their security and intelligence coordination with Jerusalem, expand economic ties, and strengthen diplomatic engagement quietly and incrementally. These steps will reflect calculated geopolitical realism far more than fleeting enthusiasm.

Privately, Arab Gulf elites continue to marvel at Israeli security prowess, Zionist determination, global Jewish influence, and even the women of Tel Aviv and the network of organizations dedicated to hasbarah—to making the case for Israel. Yet these same elites are calculating, self-interested, dispassionate, and transactional. Of all the Middle East’s leaders, the Gulf monarchs are most likely to put ideology second to practical and achievable goals. Their admiration for Israel, therefore, won’t translate into an enthusiastic embrace born of gratitude or generosity. On the contrary, the removal of the Iranian threat reduces, rather than increases, their incentive to make meaningful concessions to Israel.

Indeed, the Gulf states may quietly reach out to the now weakened Iranian regime. With their archenemy crippled, vulnerable, and desperate, these countries have a rare opportunity to extend a lifeline, albeit conditionally. In exchange for clear, enforceable guarantees that Tehran abandon its aggressive regional ambitions, they might decide that it’s possible to rehabilitate Iran as a subordinate regional actor. This move would enable them to leverage their newfound advantage, enhancing their strategic weight against Israel and the United States, and their standing on the world stage. Such maneuvers, blending quiet collaboration with Israel alongside a cautious and conditional outreach to Iran, reflect a longstanding desire to maintain the regional balance of power, which in this case means making sure that neither Israel nor Iran become dominant.

The battered Iranian regime will face a stark choice: accept a subordinate regional status or pursue desperate retaliation. The historical record and the regime’s ideological instincts suggest that it will initially choose theatrical defiance over submission. Although its capacity to do damage has been greatly reduced, the regime’s impulse for revenge, likely through asymmetric tactics and the unleashing of its proxies, remains a threat. Yet desperation and fear for survival could eventually drive pragmatic compromise. If Tehran’s leadership concludes that holding on to power requires strategic accommodation, Gulf states may indeed find openings to establish conditional cooperation, reshaping Iran’s role from regional menace to constrained client.

Most significantly, the removal of Iran as the Middle East’s dominant threat elevates the Arab Gulf states to prime contenders for regional leadership. Objectively, Israel, with its unparalleled technological prowess, economic dynamism, military might, global cultural influence, close alliance with America, and strategic positioning, naturally ought to assume regional leadership. Yet precisely because of these attributes, the Arab states believe Israel must remain formally alienated from overt regional politics. Arab leaders of course recognize Israel’s latent capabilities and potential dominance while intentionally maintaining Israel’s outsider status, ensuring that the Jewish state remains both partner and competitor, valued yet carefully constrained. I would not be surprised if their next move is once again to call loudly for a Palestinian state—not because they actually want one, but because they want to signal that Israel remains a pariah.

Further complicating the scenario is the intense internal rivalry within the Arab Gulf itself. The fierce competition among Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE profoundly shapes their policies, often overshadowing ideological or external strategic considerations. For instance, the contrast between Qatar’s support for Islamism and the Emirati-driven Abraham Accords reveals far less about ideology and far more about this relentless competition for influence, power, and regional prestige. These mutually negating and contradictory policies will continue and likely intensify.

Among the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia unquestionably harbors the highest ambitions and clearest credentials for assuming regional leadership in the post-Iranian landscape. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, convinced that this century belongs to him and determined not to miss his historical opportunity, will vigorously assert Saudi primacy in Arab and regional affairs. This means that Riyadh, even more than other Gulf states, will engage in sophisticated, multidirectional diplomacy designed to consolidate regional influence, project soft power, and deepen international alliances. Pragmatically, Saudi Arabia will likely intensify cooperation with Israel in security and technology, albeit discreetly, while also positioning itself as the indispensable interlocutor among Western powers, the broader Arab world, and even a weakened Iran. But precisely because the kingdom’s ambitions run so high, its competition with neighboring Gulf states will sharpen.

Arab states will also have to think differently about Turkey, an opportunist and ambitious competitor eyeing the vacuum left by the Iranian collapse, especially in Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. Recep Tayyip Erdogan presides over a fragile economy that severely constrains his strategic reach. From the perspective of Arab Gulf leaders, this weakness suggests an opportunity. Precisely because Turkey remains both threatening and vulnerable, a carefully calibrated outreach to Iran, weakened but still influential in the territories where Ankara seeks dominance, becomes appealing. Quietly engaging a humbled Tehran could give Arabs a strategic foothold in these areas, allowing them to outflank Erdogan. In other words, cleverly managing relations with a diminished Iran may well become the Arabs’ chosen tactic for checking Turkish expansion, ensuring they, not Erdogan, reap the greatest benefits from Iran’s collapse.

Crucially, the role of the United States, still the global superpower and traditionally the ultimate arbiter of Middle Eastern geopolitics, remains uncertain yet indispensable. Whether Washington opts for a hands-on approach or continues to step back, its behavior will either supercharge or complicate these dynamics. A strong, coherent U.S. policy would clarify incentives and constraints for Arab states, possibly stabilizing the emerging order. Conversely, continued ambiguity or disengagement from Washington risks deepening regional rivalries, incentivizing more opportunism and adding layers of complexity to an already stacked geopolitical chessboard.

Since Thursday night, my phone has been flooded with euphoric messages from contacts across the Gulf, clearly reflecting how deeply they feel the significance of this moment for themselves. While the war between Israel and Iran is far from over, Israel’s early successes point toward a scenario where Iranian strategic power could be decisively weakened. If this occurs, decades of regional constraints imposed by Tehran’s aggressive posture would suddenly vanish, reinforcing the Gulf’s already rising global influence. The Gulf states are now increasingly aware of their position as influential mid-sized powers, driven by unparalleled financial liquidity, strategic global investments, and growing geopolitical weight. But ambition alone guarantees nothing.

Sectarianism—that is, exacerbating the Sunni-Shiite, or Alawite-Shiite, divide—was once Iran’s most potent ideological tool. Now it is a spent force; Sunni dominance remains unchallenged. Yet uncertainties persist. Tehran has long shaped crucial regional narratives—Palestine, “resistance,” and anti-Westernism—that Gulf states privately reject yet remain uncomfortable openly repudiating.

For the Gulf states, the weakening or collapse of Iran’s regional project also presents a critical opportunity regarding Palestine, an issue Tehran wielded against them for decades. “Countries like Saudi Arabia may talk a big game about supporting the Palestinians,” Iranian rhetoric long claimed, “but it’s the Axis of Resistance (i.e., Iran-backed militias) that actually fights for them.” Gulf elites privately resent how the Palestinian cause has long constrained their freedom of maneuver, complicating their strategic alignment with Israel and the United States. Now, with Tehran potentially neutralized, Gulf states might finally see a path to reducing Palestine’s disruptive symbolic power—although this doesn’t necessarily translate into embracing Israel.

Salutary as discarding the Palestine obsession would be—for the Gulf, for Israel, for the U.S., and above all for the Palestinians—the slogan of Palestine remains useful for Gulf leaders’ strategic leverage, particularly against Israel and the West. More importantly, it serves as a tool in the ongoing rivalries among the Gulf states as well as in their relations with competitors like Egypt and Turkey. Most likely, Palestine might lose some of its symbolic weight, and become somewhat more marginal of an issue, but its pragmatic utility in regional politics suggests it is unlikely to disappear entirely.

I have to admit that, when I heard the first reports of the Israeli campaign against Iran, I too was euphoric. I could hardly sleep from my enthusiasm that the Islamic Republic, which has caused so much death and suffering to Israelis and Arabs alike over the past half-century, might finally be at the end of its rope. But sobriety remains indispensable amid the euphoria. Israel’s dramatic strikes on Iran fundamentally alter the strategic calculus, but will not erase deeply entrenched patterns of Arab geopolitical behavior. Pragmatism, rivalry, and calculated regional maneuvering will define the coming era far more than idealistic hopes or ideological fantasies. Enduring regional dynamics, not wishful thinking, will chart the future.