On Tuesday, amid a flurry of executive orders, President Trump designated the Yemeni jihadists known as the Houthis a foreign terrorist organization (FTO), and directed the U.S. government to prevent American aid money from ending up in their hands. In doing so, he has reversed a policy decision his predecessor had made in his first few days in office. The move suggests the possibility of a more significant shift in American policy toward Yemen—a shift that would be greeted with relief in Israel.
Over the past few months, Israelis have been repeatedly awakened at night by sirens, sending them running for shelter from ballistic-missile attacks. The attacks were carried out by the Houthi regime in Yemen, which has been sporadically launching ballistic missiles and drones at Israel and at maritime traffic in the Red Sea for over a year. The Houthis have since been hit by hundreds of airstrikes launched by the U.S., the UK, and Israel, but show no signs of losing the capability or will to attack. As we stand in the critical moments of an Israel-Hamas cease-fire, it is important to understand how the Houthis got to this point, what the cease-fire means for their trajectory, and what the U.S. and its allies should do next to cope with the threat.
Jason Brodsky and I co-authored a piece for Mosaic in February 2024 titled “The World Is Not Taking the Houthis Seriously Enough.” As it turns out, fifteen months after Hamas launched its murderous attack on Israel, the Houthis remained the last member of Iran-led “axis of resistance” in the fight against Israel: a decimated Hizballah accepted a cease-fire, the Assad regime collapsed, and the Shiite militias in Iraq have been largely quiet.
As our 2024 article explains, the Houthis are simultaneously a religious group, a political-military movement, and a tribal configuration with longstanding ties to Iran. In 2011, they seized on the disruptions of the Arab Spring to help unseat Yemen’s longstanding ruler and initiated a process which culminated in their conquest of Yemen’s key population centers. They captured the capital city of Sanaa in 2014, and in doing so took control of many organs of the Yemeni state; by 2015 their forces had reached the outskirts of Yemen’s second city of Aden. They now rule over a large swath of the northwestern part of the country, and their conflicts with the internationally recognized government of Yemen and the Saudi-led coalition supporting it remain unresolved. Thus, while the Houthis are often referred to in the press as “rebels” or “terrorists,” it is important to realize that they have for some time constituted a regime, ruthlessly administering a sizeable territory, levying taxes, running schools, and orchestrating the distribution of international aid.
To understand the Houthis’ current position, it’s necessary to go back to the Stockholm Agreement, brokered by the United Nations in 2018. This cease-fire agreement took place amid an effective counterattack by the anti-Houthi coalition along the Red Sea coast, and it essentially mandated that the Houthis maintain control of Hodeidah, Yemen’s most important Red Sea port, rather than risk it being damaged in coalition strikes. Since securing this crucial economic and military-supply lifeline, Houthi fortunes have been on the rise.
Exploiting Houthi access to the sea, Iran funneled advisers and materiel to the group. In a few short years, the Houthis went from using small arms and the remnants of the previous regime’s rusting arsenal to being the first military force to launch anti-ship ballistic missiles in an operational scenario. Iran brazenly violated the UN Security Council’s arms embargo on the Houthis, and there are few documents which highlight this as clearly as the latest report from the UN Panel of Experts on Yemen. The word “Iran” appears exactly 471 times in this document, noting Tehran’s role in providing advanced weaponry, sheltering the ring responsible for smuggling these weapons into Yemen, and coordinating Houthi attacks.
All this was made possible, in part, by the policies of the Biden administration, which emboldened the Houthis and enabled their expansion. As was the case elsewhere in the region, President Biden’s focus in Yemen was on de-escalation. He mistakenly believed the U.S. could achieve this goal by pressuring Saudi Arabia to end its military campaign and accept compromises while trying to entice the Houthis to negotiate. Thus the White House withheld weapons and other support from Saudi Arabia, revoked the Houthis’ FTO designation, and invited the group to engage diplomatically. But of course this only amplified the existing difficulties in reaching a cease-fire agreement, as Riyadh already wanted out of the war while the Houthis sought to continue to squeeze more concessions out of the kingdom.
After attempting to seize more Yemeni territory and launching more missile and drone attacks on their Gulf neighbors, the Houthis agreed to a cease-fire with Riyadh in April 2022. The agreement was intended to reduce the intensity of the conflict and create space for negotiating a comprehensive Saudi-Houthi deal that could pave the way to a domestic settlement of Yemen’s civil war. Yet, even as the parties were negotiating, the Houthis took the opportunity to prepare for future conflicts. The commander of U.S. forces in the region, General Erik Kurilla, noted in March that Iran continued to provide the Houthis with funding and arms during this time, while satellite imagery revealed that the Houthis had exploited the cease-fire to expand and enhance their underground fortifications.
So, in October 2023, when Hamas launched its massacre against Israel on Simchat Torah, the Houthis were well-prepared to join in the fight. They were motivated by a radical anti-Western and anti-Semitic ideology as well as by a desire to divert domestic attention from mounting frustration over their inability to pay public-sector salaries or govern effectively. Since then, the Houthis have launched over 1,200 projectiles at Israel, international shipping, and Western maritime forces attempting to defend against their attacks. The Western response—moving sizable naval assets to the Red Sea, shooting down missiles, and even striking Houthi bases on land—has failed to discourage the group. In fact, its leadership is euphoric at the ineffectiveness of the U.S.-led effort.
The overall trends in the pace of Houthi attacks on Israel and international shipping would be difficult to attribute to any single factor. These attacks fluctuate significantly from month to month; for instance, nearly 50 attacks occurred in June 2024, compared to fewer than 20 per month from September to November of that year, and then increased again in December. Some changes in tempo may stem from successes or failures in arms procurement and production; others may reflect responses to global events; and still others may be tied to Yemen’s internal dynamics. But one thing is clear: after more than a year of trying, the U.S.-led coalition has failed to compel the Houthis to cease their attacks, nor has it consistently and significantly diminished the Houthis’ will or ability to continue them.
In December 2024, Houthi officials stated that “they will confront any Israeli aggression against [Yemen] with more precise military operations and that their support operations for the Palestinian people will not stop until the aggression stops and the siege on the Gaza Strip is lifted.” Optimists can interpret this statement as a promise to end attacks on Israel and international shipping so long as an Israel-Hamas cease-fire is in effect. A closer reading, however, raises questions as to how the group defines lifting the “siege on the Gaza Strip.” Israel’s limitations on the import of military and dual-use goods into Gaza or even the enclave’s continued economic misery (blamed on Israel) could serve a purpose analogous to that of the small area of Israel known as “Shebaa farms” for Hizballah—an otherwise meaningless pretext to continue mobilizing the public and launching attacks on Israel. This is not to say that the Houthis will not at some point make the strategic decision to pause or reduce attacks on Israel or on international shipping, but that such a pause will be temporary and based on the group’s tactical considerations rather than redefining its strategic aims to anything short of Israel’s annihilation.
In the longer-term, too, it appears highly unlikely that Houthi policies will toe a more moderate line whether there is a cease-fire in Gaza or not. In part this is because there is a mass indoctrination campaign under way in Yemen at a scale that may be unprecedented in recent decades. Millions of children are being inculcated with rabid extremist religious ideology, and they are being trained to use weapons. In August 2024, this dangerous cocktail of children, extremism, and weaponry resulted in injuries to over 30 seven-year-old children in a facility used for explosives training. Given the radicalization of Yemen’s youngest, it is difficult to imagine the group shifting away from conflict and the radical ideology that drives it. Moreover, Houthi failures in governance can be expected to grow more severe over time. If the timing of the recent fifteen-month campaign was any indicator, the group seeks “achievements” in conflicts abroad when it needs to distract from perpetually worsening problems at home and to delegitimize those calling to attention to them.
What, then, lies ahead for 2025, given that current military campaigns have failed to curb the Houthis’ appetite for escalation, and there is no guarantee their attacks will end even if the cease-fire in Gaza holds?
The Houthis will likely maintain friction with external enemies to reinforce their position as the defenders of Yemen. This may involve continued escalation on the current trajectory—targeting Israel, international shipping, and those who seek to aid in their defense. It could also entail a renewal of hostilities against Saudi Arabia in an effort to pressure the kingdom to sign an agreement that would infuse billions of dollars from the international community, and the Gulf States in particular, for “reconstruction” into Houthi-held areas; this is one of the few options that would enable the Houthis to alleviate their major economic challenges, at least temporarily. Finally, the Houthis may opt to escalate domestically by liquidating any perceived resistance in areas under their control or trying to conquer the remainder of Yemen, currently under the ruled by the anti-Houthi coalition.
But the Houthi regime is expected to face greater difficulties in 2025 than it has in previous years due to four major factors.
First, the axis of resistance has suffered devastating military setbacks over the past year. Hizballah has been severely weakened by the loss of its entire leadership, and Israeli strikes on Lebanon, Syria, and Iran itself have significantly degraded its capabilities. With Iran and Hizballah—the two primary supporters of Houthi force-building and operational advising—distracted by challenges of their own, one can expect that the level of external support for Yemeni “resistance” to be substantially diminished.
Second, the international community has grown more aware of the dangers posed by Houthi expansionism. Consequently, anti-Houthi forces in Yemen are likely to receive increased international support, while those external forces targeting the regime—such as Israel—may enjoy greater freedom of action under shifting global public opinion.
Third, a Saudi-Houthi deal was expected to provide the regime in Sanaa with a much-needed financial windfall. It now seems increasingly remote in the near-term. Previously, Saudi Arabia negotiated under relentless military pressure from the Houthis, but that dynamic has since been reversed as the Houthis are now the ones under attack. At the very least, the Saudis may seek to renegotiate to achieve more favorable terms, but they very well could abandon negotiations with this radioactive terrorist group for the foreseeable future.
Finally, the change of leadership in Washington has Iran and its proxies scrambling to figure out how to proceed. President Trump’s inauguration may have already emboldened key U.S. allies in the region, like Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, while Tehran worries about the possible reimposition of a “maximum-pressure” sanctions campaign to cripple the Iranian economy. With that in mind, Iran might try to conserve its resources and cut funding to proxies, while also seeking to rein in their malign activities to avoid drawing any further ire from the U.S. president.
All of these developments explain why the U.S., Israel, and Arab states opposed to Iranian expansion should take the opportunity to form a coalition dedicated to applying additional pressure to collapse the Houthi regime. If they are not defeated in this round, the Houthis may simply take a strategic pause to rest, re-arm, and wait for the next opportune moment to attack the U.S. and its allies. It is imperative that those who seek stability in the Middle East take the initiative away from this terrorist group and prevent it from dictating the time and place of the next confrontation. But if attacks on the Houthis until now have failed to make a difference, what will?
To begin, it’s important to make clear what such a campaign should avoid. Any strategy aimed at pressuring the Houthi regime into collapse should minimize diplomatic engagement with the group or its de-facto foreign minister, the Oman-based Mohammad Abdelsalam. The Houthis often exploit negotiations to extract initial concessions or establish temporary cease-fires that serve their long-term objectives. Western engagement and accommodation with Iran-backed groups like Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis has been the rule rather than the exception in recent decades. The parlous results of those policies indicate that such engagement can extend the lifespan of the threat to many decades while allowing its dangers to grow more severe.
President Trump’s newly appointed national security advisor Mike Waltz was absolutely correct when he explained that engaging with Iran-backed groups like Hamas (and I would argue the Houthis as well) is unlikely to yield meaningful results, and we should not distinguish between them and other jihadist groups like Islamic State or al-Qaeda. In this zero-sum game, almost any agreement the terrorist group will accept is likely one the West would be better off rejecting.
A more effective strategy should focus on dismantling key components of the Houthi regime that cannot be easily replaced. Even if the Houthis halt their attacks, the U.S., Israel, and their allies should not make the mistake of easing the pressure and giving them a chance to rebuild and prepare for their next offensive. The following three components should be included in a broader strategy to undermine Houthi control of Yemen.
First, the U.S. and its allies should identify and kill significant regime figures based on their roles, relationships to Supreme Leader Abdelmalek al-Houthi, and influence. Not all high-ranking officials are irreplaceable. For instance, Mahdi al-Mashat, the figurehead president of the Houthi regime, is not believed to be essential to its operations, as evidenced, for instance, by the fact that his predecessor, Saleh al-Sammad, was assassinated in 2018 and the regime was not thrown into turmoil. In contrast, individuals at the very core of the Houthi leadership, like Chief of Military Intelligence Abdullah “Abu Ali” al-Hakim or Chief of Internal Security Mutlaq “Abu Imad” al-Marrani, are likely involved in activities that touch upon the regime’s most vital interests. Eliminating such key figures could disrupt the regime’s functionality and potentially provoke internal discord.
Second, the coalition should also target the regime’s major financial lifelines. For example, over the past decade, the Houthis have been diverting substantial amounts of humanitarian aid to buy the continued support of loyalists. Despite this being a well-documented problem, the lack of transparency from the UN and international NGOs has made it impossible to estimate its extent. If the UN and the NGOs refuse to operate more transparently, the U.S. and its allies might consider redirecting funding from unverifiable and sometimes dubious aid programs to those forces actively opposing Houthi rule.
Third, the Houthi regime’s propaganda machine should be a critical target. Senior officials like the organization’s unofficial kingmaker Ahmed Hamed, the senior intelligence official Fawaz Nashwan, and the aforementioned chief diplomat Abdelsalam have played key roles in keeping the population of Yemen in a Houthi information bubble. The anti-Houthi coalition should focus on dismantling this apparatus by disrupting its infrastructure, countering its messaging, and targeting those responsible with sanctions and the like. Weakening this propaganda network would erode the Houthis’ iron grip on the minds of the Yemeni public.
The experience of the past decade has made it clear that the Houthis will become only more dangerous if left unchecked—and that half-measures won’t suffice in dealing with them. Weakening the regime’s core pillars—its key leadership, financial lifelines, and propaganda machinery—would significantly increase the likelihood of its collapse. Although the precise catalyst for a regime’s downfall is always uncertain until happens, taking measures to hasten that moment’s arrival serves the interests of Yemen, the Middle East, and global trade and security.
More about: Houthis, Israeli Security, U.S. Foreign policy, Yemen