Israel Should Bring Its Own Case to the Security Council

The fact that Mahmoud Abbas failed to convince the UN to recognize a Palestinian state does not mean that Israel responded successfully to Abbas’s bid, argues Emmanuel Navon. Last week’s Security Council vote simply showed Israel once again on the defensive. Instead, Navon writes, it should be actively pursuing its own strategy, and refusing to accept the narrative created by its enemies:

Right now, the Palestinians are trying to get what they want from Israel, free of charge—a full Israeli withdrawal from the territories without in any way weakening the demand for the “right of return.” Israel needs to work in the opposite direction: go to the UN to force the Palestinians to give up the right of return and dismantle UNRWA. Obviously, Israel will not be able to get a majority in either the UN General Assembly or the Security Council for such a proposal. But such a move would be very important psychologically and symbolically: instead of only Israel sitting in the international dock for its “refusal” to withdraw from the territories, the Palestinians will be exposed to the world as refusing to remove the major stumbling block to the two-national-state solution.

Read more at MIda

More about: Israel, Mahmoud Abbas, Palestinian statehood, United Nations, UNRWA

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security