In accordance with the November 2013 interim agreement known as the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA), which is still in effect, Iran was granted some limited relief from sanctions. But ever since then, write Emanuele Ottolenghi and Saeed Ghasseminejad, Iran has been circumventing the remaining sanctions with abandon. This does not augur well for any prospective deal premised on the idea that sanctions will “snap back” if Iran fails to uphold its obligations:

Iran’s [recent] economic windfall . . . goes well beyond the monthly cash transfers and temporary easing on trade stipulated in the JPOA. . . . [Tehran’s] gains are only partly due to sanctions relief: its improved position also results from lax sanctions implementation by its neighbors, reluctance by European authorities to discourage their own economies from trading with the Islamic Republic, and Tehran’s fine-tuning of its talent for bypassing sanctions. As a result, the interim nuclear deal looks increasingly like a slow-motion funeral procession for the sanctions regime. . . .

Direct trade [with Iran] is also getting a push from the new psychological environment that the interim deal has created. Few in Europe believe the sanctions will remain, and many are exploring future commercial opportunities. Meanwhile, Europe’s bilateral trade with Iran is climbing back to pre-sanctions levels—further evidence that banking sanctions are no longer effective. . . .

The Obama administration may still believe it is able to snap sanctions back at any time if Iran cheats on its commitments under a final agreement. Developments thus far under the interim deal suggest otherwise.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.