It might, write Jonathan Schanzer and Grant Rumley, even though neither Israel nor much of the Hamas ruling clique wants one:

The wild card [is] the internal fissures within Hamas. . . . [Hamas] has multiple patrons with competing regional agendas and is irredeemably fractured as a result. The group’s Iran-backed military wing, its West Bank leaders, its Gaza leaders, and political-wing figures in places like Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt are far from aligned.

Unilateral decisions taken by one or more of these figures can have deadly implications. Last summer, it was Hamas’s military leadership in Turkey that ordered the abduction and murder of three Israeli teenagers in the West Bank. That operation sparked an Israeli reprisal that soon led to escalation and then all-out war. . . .

An uneasy calm exists now between Hamas and Israel, punctuated by the predictable cantankerous rhetoric and an occasional rocket testing. None of that has come close to sparking another conflict, primarily because neither side really wants one. But what Israelis and Palestinians want may not matter now that actors like Mohammed Deif, [the leader of Hamas’s military wing in Gaza], are back in the rocket-making business, digging tunnels for the next round.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.