Syria Still Has Chemical Weapons, and so Does Islamic State

Despite American claims that Syria gave up its chemical-weapons program in 2013, there is now overwhelming evidence that Bashar al-Assad still has such weapons and is using them regularly. Dany Shoham explains, noting implications for the Iran deal:

Increasingly worried about his military position, Assad could expand the employment of chemical weapons (chiefly chlorine, during the last year) in order aggressively to defend his core territory. VX [gas], in addition to sarin, could also be very useful for that purpose. . . . If this option becomes necessary for his survival, and is the only option open to him, he will expectedly exercise it—international opinion be damned. . . .

[T]he Syrian regime has repeatedly exploited . . . the civil war and the confrontations with Islamic State (IS) and the rebels as an excuse for impeding inspections activities. Regime representatives have been able to prevent the inspectors from reaching a specific location by simply stating that it is too dangerous. If an inspection team ignores this advice, there are a number of options to ensure it does not reach its destination, the ultimate one being a physical attack, deniable under the “fog” of the civil war. . . .

The employment of weaponized chlorine by Syrian helicopters is almost routine, and, although forbidden, is tolerated by the international community. It has proved to be effective, usually dropped [on targets] in barrels. . . . IS [also] has deployed chlorine gas-based chemical weapons against Iraqi government forces, Syrian government forces, and Syrian opposition forces, and has used unidentified chemical weapons against Kurds in Kobane.

Taking a broader perspective, there are lessons to be drawn from this Syrian weapons-monitoring experience and the current debate over the P5+1 accord with Iran. . . . Effective implementation of the Iran nuclear deal is subject to good intelligence and effective monitoring. The reluctance of the international community to act forcibly regarding the inspections regime in Syria, in particular with respect to investigating its undeclared chemical-weapons capabilities, is a very bad sign.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Bashar al-Assad, Chemical weapons, Iran nuclear program, ISIS, Syrian civil war, U.S. Foreign policy

 

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF