Last week, the Israeli embassy in Egypt was formally reopened in a public ceremony—four years after a mob attack forced its closing during the height of the Arab Spring. Relations between Israel and Egypt have since improved, and security cooperation is robust, but, asks Zvi Mazel, will trade follow?

Since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi took the helm, there has been a significant lessening of tension between Cairo and Jerusalem. The new president has refrained from attacking Israel publicly, . . . though he reiterates his support for a Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as its capital. The Egyptian media are still overwhelmingly hostile, but in more subdued tones, even though there are still outbursts of hatred, mainly from Islamist circles.

What is going to happen now? Will Sisi take the momentous decision to promote much- needed economic cooperation for the benefit of both countries, fulfilling at long last the great expectations of the [1979] peace treaty? So far, the Egyptian president has been proceeding with slow and careful steps to minimize opposition from home and from Arab countries.

At the moment he is focused on the forthcoming parliamentary elections and has no wish to be embroiled in what is still a hot topic in his country. However, when—or if—his position is fully secure and Islamist terrorism under control, he is too pragmatic a man to reject mutually beneficial cooperation. This is perhaps the true meaning of Wednesday’s small, but significant, event.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.