The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) has a long history of slandering Israel and abetting terrorism while doing little to help ordinary Palestinians. Elliott Abrams comments on the most recent revelations:

In a new report, UN Watch has found a dozen UNRWA employees spewing anti-Semitic hatred and celebrating violence and terrorism in Internet postings. On Facebook pages where they identify themselves as UNRWA officials, these UN employees laud killing and kidnapping of Jews and Israelis and post vicious anti-Semitic cartoons and drawings.

This is our tax money at work: the United States is by far the largest contributor to UNRWA, at over $400 million. . . . So now what happens? Does UNRWA discipline or fire these individuals? Does Ban Ki-Moon step in? Nope, not so far. The only reaction has been—you probably guessed it—attacks on UN Watch by UNRWA’s spokesman. Not a word about these postings or the employees.

The next step should be action by the State Department and by Samantha Power, our UN ambassador, demanding that the UN wake up. . . . Either such conduct is tolerated or it is not. Either UNRWA reacts with disciplinary moves against these individuals, or it attacks UN Watch. If the latter, . . . the United States should suspend payments to UNRWA. We should not be financing the spreading of hatred by UN employees. It ought to be simple.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.