Jay Winik’s 1944 presents itself as an admiring biography of a segment of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s career, but also contains a forceful indictment of his failure to take direct action to help the Jews in Hitler’s Europe. In reviewing the book, Terry Teachout connects this failure with the basic attributes of the president’s personal and political character:

Well aware of the persistent prevalence of anti-Semitism among American voters, [Roosevelt] was prepared to do no more [in response to reports about the mass murder of the Jews] than allow the Allies to issue a joint declaration condemning German conduct as “bestial.” Nevertheless, the State Department continued to stand in the way of refugee relief, and Roosevelt declined to make any strong public statement on the subject.

Not until January 1944 did he set up a War Refugee Board whose mission was “to rescue victims of enemy oppression in imminent danger of death.” . . . But he appears to have taken no part in the subsequent War Department debate over whether to bomb Auschwitz to stop the killings. In the end, no such bombing took place, and Winik claims that there “is little doubt that the refusal to directly bomb Auschwitz was the president’s decision or at least reflected his wishes.” Other historians differ on whether FDR was in fact consulted on the matter, or whether bombing would have made a difference; but one thing is sure: it was never even tried. . . .

Roosevelt’s genius—and his tragedy—was his ruthless pragmatism, his seemingly infallible grasp of the limits of political power. For all the passion with which he would later speak of the horrors of the poverty that he longed to ameliorate, he was at the outset of his career the opposite of what we now call a “conviction politician.” Rarely would he put more than a sliver of his own carefully hoarded power at risk in the service of the ideals that he claimed to espouse.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.