Since 2012, relations between Hamas and its erstwhile patron Iran have been chilly, mainly because of the latter’s support for Bashar al-Assad. The Islamic Republic briefly tried to cultivate Palestinian Islamic Jihad as its main Gazan client, but found it insufficiently pliable. Now, writes Ehud Yaari, Iran is investing in an Islamic Jihad splinter group:

Over the past year and a half, the Quds Force of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps, assisted by . . . Hizballah, has financed and provided media exposure to the al-Sabirin (“the Patient Ones”) movement in the Gaza Strip. This new militant group seeks to emulate Hizballah and Iraqi Shiite militias such as the Badr organization, known for its blatant pro-Iranian sentiments. Iran hopes that al-Sabirin will become a reliable proxy militia in Gaza.

Al-Sabirin is headed by Hisham Salem. . . . Salem, now in his early 50s, is a little-known former mid-level commander of Islamic Jiahd. . . . Rumors among Islamist circles in Gaza claim that Salem receives an annual budget of $10 million from Iran, typically smuggled in suitcases through the tunnels along the border with Egypt. . . .

It seems that Salem’s sponsors in Tehran and Beirut are disappointed . . . with how little progress he has made. Al-Sabirin remains nearly unrecognized by most Palestinians. . . . Nevertheless, Iran most likely regards al-Sabirin as an extremely useful tool to help keep Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in line by signaling to them that it has alternatives. Thus, the survival of Salem’s project seems guaranteed for the foreseeable future. In that regard, the United States should keep an eye on this group before it becomes the powerful militia that Iran and Hizballah are seeking to create, and before al-Sabirin obtains a solid foothold in the Gaza Strip.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.