In Gaza, Hamas has been fighting groups affiliated with or inspired by Islamic State (IS); in Iraq and Syria, Iran and its proxies have fought IS. But in the Sinai, the local IS branch and its predecessors have long collaborated with Hamas, thanks to funds and materiel provided by Tehran. Arik Agassi explains:

The ongoing cooperation between Hamas and IS in the Sinai began even before Hamas took over Gaza in 2007. It started when Hamas began cultivating relations with Bedouin tribes and Palestinians living in the Sinai. At the time, [what is now the IS branch] was still known by its previous name, Ansar Bait al-Maqdis (ABAM). . . .

The jihadists rightfully saw that Egypt’s hold on the peninsula was weak. As a result, it was a place where they could operate for an extended period of time without risk of being wiped out by Egyptian security forces. Accordingly, ABAM established its headquarters in mountainous areas with no Egyptian presence and extremely difficult conditions on the ground. . . .

Hamas-ABAM cooperation expanded after Israel pulled out of the Gaza Strip, when the smuggling of people, goods, food, weapons, and fuel through tunnels under the Egyptian border into Gaza increased exponentially. . . . In recent months, and especially since November 2014, when ABAM swore allegiance to IS, Hamas has been increasing its clandestine military cooperation with the group. . . .

Through the Iran-Hamas-IS axis, the Sinai branch of what it is now viewed as the world’s most dangerous terrorist group is flush with Tehran’s money, weapons, technology, and expertise. . . . Moreover, Iran has . . . continued arms deliveries to Hamas through the Red Sea and the Sinai even though it must be aware of the fact that IS will take its cut of these shipments as payment for helping smuggle them into the Gaza Strip.

Analyzing the recent direct Iranian attack on Israel, and Israel’s security situation more generally, Michael Oren looks to the 2015 agreement to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. That, and President Biden’s efforts to resurrect the deal after Donald Trump left it, are in his view the source of the current crisis:

Of the original motivations for the deal—blocking Iran’s path to the bomb and transforming Iran into a peaceful nation—neither remained. All Biden was left with was the ability to kick the can down the road and to uphold Barack Obama’s singular foreign-policy achievement.

In order to achieve that result, the administration has repeatedly refused to punish Iran for its malign actions:

Historians will survey this inexplicable record and wonder how the United States not only allowed Iran repeatedly to assault its citizens, soldiers, and allies but consistently rewarded it for doing so. They may well conclude that in a desperate effort to avoid getting dragged into a regional Middle Eastern war, the U.S. might well have precipitated one.

While America’s friends in the Middle East, especially Israel, have every reason to feel grateful for the vital assistance they received in intercepting Iran’s missile and drone onslaught, they might also ask what the U.S. can now do differently to deter Iran from further aggression. . . . Tehran will see this weekend’s direct attack on Israel as a victory—their own—for their ability to continue threatening Israel and destabilizing the Middle East with impunity.

Israel, of course, must respond differently. Our target cannot simply be the Iranian proxies that surround our country and that have waged war on us since October 7, but, as the Saudis call it, “the head of the snake.”