Taking the Sponsors of Palestinian Terror to Court

In 1995, an operative of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) drove a van filled with explosives into an Israeli bus, killing the American college student Alisa Flatow along with seven Israelis, and wounding dozens more. With the help of the attorneys Steven Perles and Thomas Fay, Flatow’s father Stephen sued Iran, the main sponsor of PIJ, initiating a legal battle that went on for over a decade. Convincing a U.S. court to award damages proved relatively easy, but convincing the Clinton administration to pay the damages out of Iranian assets proved nearly impossible. M. R. O’Connor tells the story of the case, and the eventual victory:

Perles and Fay . . . knew that within a few miles of their own offices were three pieces of real estate that no one could deny were Iranian: the embassy chancery of Iran, the residence of the minister of cultural affairs of the embassy of Iran, and the residency of the military attaché of the embassy of Iran. All three had been seized by the State Department on April 7, 1980. . . .

Stephen Flatow’s legal team filed a writ of attachment—a court order to seize an asset—for the properties on July 8, 1998. The next day, at a hearing, . . . they were astounded to see over a dozen government lawyers. The government wanted [the court] to deny the writ. . . .

Perles watched as Flatow’s head sank. He had brought the Iranians to court with the belief that he had the powerful will of President Clinton behind him. Instead it seemed he had now gained a formidable foe, one who was prepared to fight him with all the resources available to his administration. . . .

Some time later, the legal team received a tip from the State Department about an FBI investigation into the Alavi Foundation, a private charity that served as an Iranian front organization; perhaps damages could be awarded from its assets:

Perles and Fay sent a request to the Justice Department: would the government support their arguments about the Alavi Foundation in court? They never got a response.

Flatow saw the silence as a double-cross: they had been led to the Alavi Foundation by the government, which then refused to go the next step and give them proof that would win the case. The proceedings revealed how cautiously the administration was protecting its relations with Iran.

It was not until 2000, after multiple interventions by Congress, that Perles and Fay were able to obtain a settlement for their client.

Read more at Atavist

More about: Bill Clinton, Iran, Israel & Zionism, Law, Lawfare, Palestinian terror

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security