To judge by the statements made by the president and secretary of state, U.S. Syria policy has shifted from supporting regime change to actively opposing it. Ari Heistein notes that this is testimony to Assad’s successful strategy of encouraging the expansion of Islamic State (IS) and then presenting himself as the only viable alternative to it. Some contend that leaving the Syrian dictator in power will bring benefits in the form of post-war stability. Heistein, however, argues that an Assad victory will bring no such thing:

[P]ost-war Assad will probably make pre-war Assad look like a dandy. If there is anything worse than a dictator who feels invincible, it is a dictator who is afraid of his own shadow. . . . [I]t is safe to assume that Assad will respond with extremely brutal force any time someone so much as mumbles a complaint.

The coherence of pro-regime forces, composed of numerous militias in addition to the Syrian Arab Army, is another major question mark. . . . [M]ilitias vaguely referred to as shabiha are more like criminal networks that have vested financial interests in the regime and serve as its enforcers. Will Assad’s tattered forces be able to control these armed groups once the war ends? . . . In 2013, a Syrian official predicted discord from within pro-regime militias saying, “After this crisis, there will be a 1,000 more crises—the militia leaders. Two years ago they went from nobody to somebody with guns and power. How can we tell these shabiha to go back to being a nobody again?” . . .

With such grim prospects for Assadistan, the regime hardly seems to be the choice for stability that its backers have framed it as. It is likely that the Syrian regime will deal ruthlessly with the instability caused by the dismal economic situation and the diffusion of weapons and power to local militias.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.