Examining the Castro regime’s longstanding friendship with Iran, and its somewhat more recent friendship with North Korea, A.J. Caschetta concludes that the combination of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the thawing of U.S. relations with Cuba bodes ill for American security:

[In the past], Cuba has cooperated with both Iran and North Korea. Under the shah, Iran had no diplomatic ties with Cuba, but after 1979 [it] was one of the first nations to recognize [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini’s regime as the legitimate government of Iran. Since then, ties between the two have been increasing steadily. In May of 2001, Fidel Castro visited Iran, where he said that “Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees.” . . .

Aside from Castro’s visit to Pyongyang in 1986 and some weapons transfers in the 1980s, there had been little to report [on Cuba’s relations with North Korea], until recently. The Economist offers 2008 as the year that cooperation between the two countries began increasing. In 2013, the North Korean ship Chong Chon Gang was interdicted in Panama after leaving Cuba laden with Soviet weaponry hidden under mountains of sugar. . . .

A Cuban role in the axis would be more than ideological. . . . Iran and North Korea are less interested in old weapons and [cigars] than in the one thing Cuba has always offered America’s enemies—physical proximity. The USSR used Cuba as a forward operating base in the cold war. Why would Iran and North Korea not do the same?

Most analysts are focused on North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), but a medium-range missile fired from Cuba could reach most of the United States. Cuba would also be a good launch point for an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack on the U.S.

Notably, Iran’s medium-range missile program has continued apace since the completion of the nuclear deal, and there is reason to believe the Islamic Republic is developing the capabilities for an EMP attack as well.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.