Since 2011, some 1.4 million Syrian refugees have entered Jordan; they now constitute 13 percent of the country’s population, and their presence is straining the kingdom’s already weak economy. Robert Satloff and David Schenker offer some suggestions for preventing a political upheaval:

Jordan’s stability is a high priority for the United States. It is a main partner in fighting Islamic State, in confronting Iranian expansionism, and in supporting a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Jordan’s quiet cooperation with its treaty partner, Israel, is a plus for U.S. regional interests. . . .

Washington should [i]ncrease humanitarian assistance [to the refugees]. . . . [It also] should press European and Arab allies (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait) to add an annual budget-support component of $1 billion to its existing infrastructure investment projects in the kingdom.

To entice Syrians to remain in the region, if not in Syria itself, it will be necessary to provide a degree of economic opportunity. Washington should encourage European states —in particular, Germany—to invest in job-creation initiatives in Jordan, once Jordan provides a larger number of Syrian refugees with work permits. . . .

Although Jordan has implemented some under-the-radar efforts to support communities on the Syrian side of the border, those efforts lack the imprimatur and staying power of a fully supported humanitarian safe zone, where U.S.-led coalition forces provide security for the shelter and feeding of internally displaced Syrians. Establishing such a zone with partners in the anti-Islamic State coalition would serve both U.S. strategic interests in safeguarding Jordan and humanitarian concerns by protecting civilians.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.