Did Joshua Really Make the Sun Stand Still?

In a famous episode in the book of Joshua, the title figure declares: “Stand still, O sun, at Gibeon, O moon in the Valley of Aijellon!”; in response, the text tells us, “the sun stood still and the moon halted.” These verses are usually taken to mean that God slowed the progress of the sun across the heavens to give the Israelites more time for their battle against the Amorites. The passage would be cited by, on the one hand, religious critics of Copernicus and Galileo as proof the sun revolves around the earth and by, on the other hand, rationalist critics of the Bible as proof of Scripture’s fallibility. Mark Chavalas argues that it means something else entirely (free registration required):

The phraseology in Joshua 10:12-13 sounds suspiciously like the vocabulary used in Mesopotamian celestial-omen texts. In fact, it is clear that the relative position of the sun and moon played a role in determining military movements [in ancient Mesopotamia]. Kings consulted omen priests who told them whether a particular solar/lunar juxtaposition was propitious for victory. . . .

Many of the technical phrases in these omens concern the “stopping” and “waiting” of the heavenly bodies. From the standpoint of the viewer on earth, [according to the astrologers], the sun and moon “stopped and waited” for each other (that is, they were seen together: a bad omen for the fifteenth day after a full moon). . . . [Such] celestial-omen observation was not just prevalent in Mesopotamia but [also] in northwest Syria at the sites of Ugarit, Mari, and Emar (all in regions with significant Amorite connections). . . .

[T]his context also helps answer an easily anticipated question: why would a follower of the God of Israel ask for an omen, a practice that was considered divination and regarded [by the Pentateuch] as a capital crime? The answer is that . . . Joshua was not asking for a celestial phenomenon for himself, or even for Israel, but probably for the enemy; he must have known what it meant for them to have the sun and moon aligned on the fifteenth day [after the full moon], presumably the day of battle. If they received a bad omen, it would have significantly lowered their [morale].

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More about: Astrology, Book of Joshua, Hebrew Bible, Religion & Holidays, Science and Religion

Iran’s Defeat May Not Be Immediate, but Effective Containment Is at Hand

Aug. 20 2018

In the 1980s, the U.S. pursued a policy of economic, military, and political pressure on the Soviet Union that led to—or at least hastened—its collapse while avoiding a head-on military confrontation. Some see reasons to hope that a similar strategy might bring about the collapse of the Islamic Republic. Frederick Kagan, however, argues against excessive optimism. Carefully comparing the current situation of Iran to that of the Gorbachev-era USSR, he suggests instead that victory over Tehran can be effectively achieved even if the regime persists, at least for the time being:

What must [an Iran] strategy accomplish in order to advance American national security and vital national interests? Regime change was the only outcome during the cold war that could accomplish those goals, given the conventional and nuclear military power of the Soviet Union. Iran is much weaker by every measure and much more vulnerable to isolation than the Soviets were. . . . Isolating Iran from external resources and forcing the regime to concentrate on controlling its own population would be major accomplishments that would transform the Middle East. . . .

It is vital to note that the strategy toward the Soviet Union included securing Western Europe against the Soviet threat and foreclosing Soviet efforts to pare America’s allies, especially West Germany, away from it while simultaneously supporting (in an appropriately limited fashion) the Solidarity uprising in Poland and the anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan. It is not meaningful to speak of a victory strategy against Iran that does not include contesting Iranian control and influence in Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq while strengthening and hardening the Arab frontline states (including Oman and Qatar) against Iranian influence.

Syria is Iran’s Afghanistan—it is the theater in which Iranian forces are most vulnerable, where Iranian popular support for the war is wearing thin, and where the U.S. can compel [Iran] to expend its limited resources on a defensive battle. Iraq is Iran’s Poland—the area Iran has come to dominate, but with limitations, and a country Iran’s leaders believe they cannot afford to lose. The U.S. is infinitely better positioned to contest Iran’s control over Iraq than it ever was in Poland (and similarly better positioned in Syria than it was in Afghanistan).

A long-term approach would focus on building a consensus among America’s allies about the need to implement a victory strategy. It would deter the Russians and Chinese from stepping in to keep Iran alive. It would disrupt the supply chain of strategic materials Iran needs to advance its nuclear and conventional military capabilities. And it would force Iran to fight hard for its positions in Iraq and Syria while simultaneously pressing the Iranian economy in every possible way. Such a strategy would almost certainly force the Islamic Republic back in on itself, halt and reverse its movement toward regional hegemony, exacerbate schisms within the Iranian leadership and between the regime and the people, and possibly, over time, and in a uniquely Iranian way, lead to a change in the nature of the regime.

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More about: Cold War, Iran, Politics & Current Affairs, Soviet Union, U.S. Foreign policy