Severe though the ongoing wave of terror may be, argues Boaz Ganor, it does not merit the term intifada (Arabic for “uprising”), since—compared with the first and second intifadas—there have been relatively few perpetrators and victims. Rather, he writes, it is a peculiarly Palestinian manifestation of a global phenomenon:

In the current wave of terror, we are dealing with self-initiated and locally initiated attacks. The term “lone wolf,” [however], is too narrow to include the characteristics of the phenomenon, as is the phrase “attacks by [isolated] individuals.” . . .

[The motivation for these attacks is rooted in] a deep hatred of Israel, personal and social frustration, despair over the national and economic situation, and generational conflict. (Attacks are often an assault on parental authority in general, or on the father’s authority in particular.)

All of these are channeled at a particular moment and under the influence of deliberate and prolonged incitement into an act considered by the terrorists themselves and many members of Palestinian, Arab, and Muslim society to be an admirable expression of altruism, patriotism, and religious devotion.

In most cases, it is not a momentary whim or crazy emotional outburst [that precipitates an attack], but rather an informed personal or group decision that crystallizes over time. In many cases, the decision is the result of subjective cost-benefit considerations. In other cases, it is a response to an urge for adventure wrapped in an attractive cloak of altruism and patriotism.

The terrorists are not necessarily different from young Muslims in the West who . . . decide to join a group of foreign fighters in conflict zones or carry out self-initiated or locally initiated terrorist attacks in their own country (such as Syed Farook and Tashfeen Malik, who carried out the terrorist attack in San Bernardino, California, in 2015).

This phenomenon . . . currently threatens the entire world.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.