The Case for a More Active Israeli Role in Syria

Over the past five years, Israel has carefully limited its role in the bloody civil war raging across its northern border. Amos Yadlin argues that now is the time to take a more active approach to ensuring the fall of Bashar al-Assad, a long-time enemy who has slaughtered hundreds of thousands of his own people. Without becoming a full-fledged participant in the war, Yadlin argues, Israel should use the diplomatic and military means at its disposal to advance the goal of defeating Assad:

In addition to the moral [imperative], which in its own right provides sufficient justification for Assad’s ouster, the fall of [his] regime is a strategic Israeli interest. The radical axis led by Iran that runs through Assad-controlled Syria to Hizballah in Lebanon, and embraces the strategic goal of putting an end to Israel, is the most concrete threat the state of Israel faces today. The axis’s current military capabilities, and the additional capabilities it can be expected to acquire, constitute the industrial and scientific resources of a regional power. Its recent strengthening vis-à-vis its rivals in Syria has made it clear that action must be taken to prevent this problematic strategic development, preferably in coordination with major countries in the region and the global superpowers.

Some argue that the threat posed by Islamic State is no less serious and must be dealt with first—and indeed, the severity of the Islamic State threat, which has been debated in Israel over the past two years, must not be underestimated. However, contending with this issue should not prevent Israel from assigning a clear strategic preference to the Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Beirut challenge. . . .

[A]lthough Islamic State attracts some Sunnis in Syria while Assad remains in power, it is extremely likely that an end to his rule and the evolution of a moderate Sunni alternative will greatly weaken Islamic State’s appeal. Moreover, recent reports confirm suspicions regarding cooperation between the Assad regime and Islamic State and bolster the assumption that these two extremist parties share a common interest in weakening and eliminating any moderate alternative and helping safeguard the survival of one another. Israel, on the other hand, remains virtually alone against the pro-Iranian radical axis and can rely on no one but itself.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Bashar al-Assad, Hizballah, Iran, ISIS, Israel & Zionism, Israeli Security, Syrian civil war

Hizballah Is Learning Israel’s Weak Spots

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Hizballah, Iron Dome, Israeli Security