In 2014, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) ruled that Israel should be considered an occupying power in Gaza, despite the fact that every Israeli soldier and civilian was removed nine years earlier. The ICC’s conclusion is frequently echoed by various UN bodies as well as journalists and politicians; as Gilead Sher and Dana Wolf explain, it is patently absurd:

Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations outlines legal requirements for occupation, which include the physical existence of hostile troops in an area, so that the legitimate government is incapable of exercising effective powers of government. Conversely, military withdrawal is a prerequisite for clearly demarcating the end of occupation. As such, never since the enactment of the Hague Regulations has an occupation been recognized without a foreign army present. [Yet] the international community still erroneously perceives the [Gaza] Strip as a territory under Israel’s responsibility, . . . without consideration of the fact that Israel does not meet the basic criteria of an “occupier” under international law. . . .

This is why the international community should intervene and amend the legal distortion that has been perpetuated since Israel’s disengagement from Gaza. It should explicitly declare that Israel’s occupation of Gaza has ended. In exchange for such a formal declaration, Israel should [offer to] join the international effort to rehabilitate Gaza under careful security measures, [with] international coordination and supervision. Israel could further propose that if, as a result of successful rehabilitation, Hamas’s attacks on Israel subside for an extended period, it would seriously consider the alleviation of the closure of the Strip in coordination with Egypt, and the construction of a Gaza seaport. Everyone would benefit except the terrorist groups in Gaza.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.