Since the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was concluded a year ago next Thursday, Iran has continued to support terror, tested ballistic missiles, waged cyberwarfare against the U.S., captured American sailors (violating international law in the process), and contributed to war and instability in Syria, Iraq, and even Bahrain. Meanwhile inspectors have less access than before to potential nuclear sites in Iran. Asking whether any good at all has come from this deal with Iran, Elliott Abrams answers:

The deal has postponed Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, but at the cost of legitimizing [its right to obtain such weapons after the deal expires]. That’s the “benefit”: the supposed ten-year postponement.

That benefit accrues, of course, only if Iran sticks to the deal and actually slows its program and does not “break out.”

What is Iran’s breakout time? We were told last year that it was at least one year. The Institute for Science and International Security says the actual breakout time may be only seven months. Because of the limited information that International Atomic Energy Agency reports [on Iranian nuclear activity] now contain, we know less than we used to. . . .

So there you have it. . . . Under the deal, we do not really know Iran’s breakout time; we have legitimized its nuclear program; we have strengthened the regime with money and a propaganda victory; and we see Iran’s support for aggression and terror rising.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.