What the Saudi Visit to Israel Does—and Doesn’t—Mean

A delegation of Saudi academics, businessmen, and other notables, led by a retired general, came to Jerusalem last week, where they met with Knesset members as well as with Dore Gold, Israel’s top diplomat. Aaron David Miller comments on the visit’s significance:

No current Saudi officials were included, but the visit could not have happened without high-level governemnt approval. This is not necessarily a harbinger of strengthening ties between Saudi Arabia and Israel. But it indicates how Saudi Arabia and the region are changing. . . .

[N]on-governmental meetings between Israelis and Saudis in academic and policy forums are fairly common. . . . But publicly announced meetings in Jerusalem at the King David hotel are different. The nominal purpose was discussion of the 2002 [Saudi peace] initiative. . . . It stands out that the Saudis did not call for Israel’s blanket acceptance of the 2002 initiative [as they have previously done]. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has spoken about his willingness to accept the Saudi plan—with modifications. . . .

A decade ago, sending a Saudi delegation to Israel without some significant quid pro quo or breakthrough in the peace process would have been unimaginable. . . . [But] testing the waters is one thing; to make major and unmatched concessions on a matter that still resonates broadly and deeply amid the Arab world’s divides and dysfunction would be quite another. The Saudis may be less hostile to Israel, but that doesn’t mean that they won’t require big concessions as the price of getting closer.

Read more at Wall Street Journal

More about: Arab peace initiative, Benjamin Netanyahu, Dore Gold, Israel & Zionism, Israel diplomacy, Saudi Arabia

Israel Just Sent Iran a Clear Message

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.

Read more at Jewish Chronicle

More about: Iran, Israeli Security