Last summer, the Palestinian Authority president made serial threats to resign, to dismantle the PA, to end security cooperation with the IDF, to sue Israel in the International Criminal Court, and to tear up the Oslo Accords. He has since backed down from all of them and even seems to be trying to end the “knife intifada,” which his own party played a large role in instigating. Yoni Ben Menachem examines his motivations:

[T]he main consideration guiding eighty-one-year-old Abbas is to remain in power while seeking an appropriate successor, one who will allow him to retire honorably and will ensure the well-being of his family and his two sons’ economic interests.

Abbas is not looking for diplomatic adventures. He is sticking with his strategy of internationalizing the conflict; hence, he supports the French [peace] initiative. That initiative could lead to an international conference by the end of the year while entailing a minimum of risk to Abbas’ rule. . . .

Particularly worrisome to him is the [possibility now being considered by the Israeli Defense Ministry] of opening a dialogue with Palestinian academics and businesspeople. Abbas sees this as going over his head to find a new Palestinian address, thereby undermining his legitimacy as leader of the Palestinian people. . . .

As Abbas sees it, [this] new plan poses a threat to his continued rule. . . . According to senior Fatah officials, from now on he will take great care not to give the Israeli defense establishment pretexts to take measures to undermine senior PA senior officials as well as Abbas himself, such as invalidating their official VIP travel documents, lifting the easier conditions at the border crossings, and so on.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.